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CITY GOVERNMENTS AND
PREDATORY LENDING
Jonathan L. Entin* and Shadya Y. Yazback†
Predatory lending has generated increasing attention in recent
years.  The practice involves loans to homeowners who frequently
cannot pay the associated costs and therefore lose their homes.
Predatory lending is heavily concentrated in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods1 and disproportionately affects minorities2
and the elderly.3  The consequences of predatory lending are dev-
astating not only to the consumers who fall prey to unscrupulous
lenders’ tactics, but to the community as a whole.4  For these rea-
sons, many cities have tried to regulate or prohibit the practice.
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law and Political Sci-
ence, Case Western Reserve University.
† Senior Policy Analyst, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  The views ex-
pressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
System or the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
1. HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDA-
TORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 47 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/
Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD Report]; Paul S. Calem et al., The
Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. &
ECON. 393, 401 (2004) [hereinafter Calem et al., Neighborhood Distribution]; Paul S.
Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime Lending: Evidence from Disparate
Cities, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 603, 611 (2004) [hereinafter Calem et al., Neigh-
borhood Patterns].  Although predatory loans are disproportionately subprime, not all
subprime loans are predatory. See infra text accompanying note 8 and following note
15.
2. HUD Report, supra note 1, at 47; Calem et al., Neighborhood Distribution,
supra note 1, at 401; Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns, supra note 1, at 615.
3. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 14
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf [hereinafter GAO
Report].
4. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland has explained:
Predatory lending is a national problem that is reallocating public and pri-
vate dollars away from low-and-moderate-income families and struggling in-
ner-city neighborhoods to a variety of private parties.  Federal and local tax
dollars have been invested in such communities, adding to private donations,
church contributions, bank loans made under [the Community Reinvestment
Act], and work done by nonprofits and community volunteer organizations
such as Habitat for Humanity.
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Predatory Lending Strikes at the Heart of Ameri-
can Neighborhoods, Community Reinvestment Forum 2 (Summer 2000), available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/CommAffairs/CRForum/frmsp00/Smr00.pdf.
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This Article assesses the legal challenges that cities can face in
trying to deal with predatory lending.5  Part I provides an overview
of the problem.  Part II focuses on the common law and statutory
claims that cities might bring, with particular emphasis on the evi-
dentiary issues that cities can face and the requirements of standing
that could severely limit the effectiveness of lawsuits brought by
municipalities.  The Article then turns to city efforts to regulate
predatory lending pursuant to their home rule authority, efforts
that can be stymied both by state laws that supersede municipal
ordinances and federal regulations that preempt state and local ini-
tiatives.  Part III focuses on home rule, explaining that most courts
that have addressed the question have held municipal initiatives to
be preempted by state laws. Part IV shows that the federal govern-
ment might override much of what cities and states try to do to
attack the problem.  The Article concludes that, despite the legal
obstacles facing cities that want to regulate predatory lending, local
efforts have served as a catalyst for predatory lending policies at
the state level and might stimulate more effective national policies
as well.
5. We do not address the wisdom or effectiveness of predatory-lending laws, a
subject that has generated considerable discussion.  On the wisdom of such laws, com-
pare GAO Report, supra note 3, at 76 (suggesting that market forces will eventually
eliminate predatory lending), with Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory
Lending: What Does Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 715
(2004) (arguing that the market cannot impose sufficient discipline to drive out preda-
tory lenders), and Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38
AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005) (using findings from behavioral economics to claim that
borrowers do not act in accordance with the assumptions underlying the position of
advocates of the market approach).  On the effectiveness of North Carolina’s pioneer-
ing law in this field, compare Gregory Elliehausen & Michael E. Staten, Regulation of
Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina’s Predatory Lending
Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 411 (2004) (concluding that the statute reduced
the availability of credit to lower-income consumers), with Keith D. Harvey & Peter
J. Nigro, Do Predatory Lending Laws Influence Mortgage Lending?  An Analysis of
the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 435 (2004)
(finding that the measure resulted in less aggressive marketing by non-bank lenders
and that minority and lower-income borrowers were less likely to get loans), and Ro-
berto G. Quercia et al., Assessing the Impact of North Carolina’s Predatory Lending
Law, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 573 (2004) (arguing that the law succeeded in re-
ducing abusive practices without restricting access to legitimate subprime loans).  On
the limited utility of disclosure requirements as a remedy, see Lauren E. Willis, Deci-
sionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65
MD. L. REV. 707, 754-806 (2006).
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I. A PRIMER ON PREDATORY LENDING
Predatory lending has yet to be defined in a comprehensive fash-
ion.  A joint report issued in June 2000 by the U.S. Department of
the Treasury and U.S. Department for Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (“HUD”) noted: “Although home mortgage lending is reg-
ulated by state and federal authorities, none of the statu[t]es and
regulations governing mortgage transactions provides a definition
of predatory lending.”6
Defining predatory lending is difficult for two reasons.  First,
loan attributes may or may not be “predatory” depending on the
sophistication or financial position of the borrower.7  Second, the
definition of predatory lending cannot be static because the lending
market is always evolving in light of technological, regulatory, and
judicial advancements.
It is important to distinguish predatory lending from subprime
lending.  Subprime lending—the extension of credit to consumers
who would be unable to obtain credit in the primary market—typi-
cally involves higher interest rates and fees to account for the in-
creased risk associated with a particular consumer’s credit history.
The higher rates are not predatory per se.  It is the circumstances
surrounding the loan that typically make the loan predatory.8  For
that reason, most government agencies and academic experts de-
fine predatory lending in terms of specific elements, practices, or
effects.  In 2001, then-Federal Reserve Governor Edward Gram-
lich proposed an approach to predatory lending that defined the
practice in terms of elements:
[T]ypically predatory lending involves at least one, and perhaps
all three, of the following elements:
making unaffordable loans based on the assets of the bor-
rower rather than on the borrower’s ability to repay an obli-
gation (“asset-based lending”)
inducing a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly in order to
charge high points and fees each time the loan is refinanced
(“loan flipping”)
6. HUD Report, supra note 1, at 1.
7. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 19.
8. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2002).
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engaging in fraud or deception to conceal the true nature of
the loan obligation from an unsuspecting or unsophisticated
borrower.9
More expansive government definitions include a list of specific
practices.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly
known as the General Accounting Office) provides perhaps the
most comprehensive definition:
While there is no universally accepted definition, predatory
lending is associated with the following loan characteristics and
lending practices:
Excessive fees. Abusive loans may include fees that greatly
exceed the amounts justified by the costs of the services pro-
vided and the credit and interest rate risks involved.  Lenders
may add these fees to the loan amounts rather than requiring
payment up front, so the borrowers may not know the exact
amount of the fees they are paying.
Excessive interest rates.  Mortgage interest rates can legiti-
mately vary based on the characteristics of borrowers (such as
creditworthiness) and of the loans themselves.  However, in
some cases, lenders may charge interest rates that far exceed
what would be justified by any risk-based pricing calculation,
or lenders may “steer” a borrower with an excellent credit re-
cord to a higher-rate loan intended for borrowers with poor
credit histories.
Single-premium credit insurance. Credit insurance is a loan
product that repays the lender should the borrower die or be-
come disabled.  In the case of single-premium credit insur-
ance, the full premium is paid all at once—by being added to
the amount financed in the loan—rather than on a monthly
basis.  Because adding the full premium to the amount of the
loan unnecessarily raises the amount of interest borrowers
pay, single-premium credit insurance is generally considered
inherently abusive.
Lending without regard to ability to repay.  Loans may be
made without regard to a borrower’s ability to repay the loan.
In these cases, the loan is approved based on the value of the
asset (the home) that is used as collateral.  In particularly
egregious cases, monthly loan payments have equaled or ex-
ceeded the borrower’s total monthly income.  Such lending
can quickly lead to foreclosure of the property.
9. Fed. Reserve Gov. Edward Gramlich, Remarks at Cleveland State University,
Cleveland, Ohio (Mar. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/20010323/default.htm.
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Loan flipping.  Mortgage originators may refinance borrow-
ers’ loans repeatedly in a short period of time without any
economic gain for the borrower.  With each successive refi-
nancing, these originators charge high fees that “strip” bor-
rowers’ equity in their homes.
Fraud and deception.  Predatory lenders may perpetrate out-
right fraud through actions such as inflating property apprais-
als and doctoring loan applications and settlement documents.
Lenders may also deceive borrowers by using “bait and
switch” tactics that mislead borrowers about the terms of their
loan.  Unscrupulous lenders may fail to disclose items as re-
quired by law or in other ways may take advantage of borrow-
ers’ lack of financial sophistication.
Prepayment penalties.  Penalties for prepaying a loan are not
necessarily abusive, but predatory lenders may use them to
trap borrowers in high-cost loans.
Balloon payments.  Loans with balloon payments are struc-
tured so that monthly payments are lower but one large pay-
ment (the balloon payment) is due when the loan matures.
Predatory loans may contain a balloon payment that the bor-
rower is unlikely to be able to afford, resulting in foreclosure
or refinancing with additional high costs and fees.  Sometimes,
lenders market a low monthly payment without adequate dis-
closure of the balloon payment.10
In the legal arena, Professors Engel and McCoy have produced a
definition of predatory lending that focuses on the composition of
the loan to determine whether it is predatory.  While most of the
Engel-McCoy definition is encompassed in the GAO definition,
Professors Engel and McCoy also include waiver of meaningful le-
gal redress—usually through mandatory arbitration clauses that re-
quire borrowers to waive judicial redress and class action
participation—as an indicator of a predatory loan.11
From the above definitions, one can distill a definition of preda-
tory lending in its broadest conception: predatory lending occurs
when a lender extends to a consumer a loan with unfavorable
terms that are structured to strip the equity from the home, possi-
bly resulting in foreclosure on the home used to secure the loan
and personal bankruptcy for the consumer.
10. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 18-19.
11. Engel & McCoy, supra note 8, at 1260; see also Kathleen Engel & Patricia
McCoy, Predatory Lending and Community Development at Loggerheads 5 (Cleve-
land Marshall Legal Studies Paper 05-105, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=687161.
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The definitional complexity makes it difficult to quantify the ag-
gregate costs of predatory lending.  The Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act12 (“HMDA”) requires that mortgage lenders with an
office in a metropolitan statistical area disclose data related to all
the home mortgages they make each year.13  HMDA data cover
approximately eighty percent of all home loans nationwide.14  The
HMDA data show that 26.2 percent of covered loans had annual
percentage rates sufficient to trigger coverage by the federal preda-
tory lending laws,15 but not all loans covered by the federal preda-
tory lending laws are necessarily predatory in nature.  Even if
comprehensive data were available about every home loan, it
would still be impossible to identify the number of loans that are
predatory, as no data set could accurately measure the lender’s in-
tent—a critical element of predatory lending.  Despite the
problems of data availability, some researchers have attempted to
quantify the costs: an oft-cited 2001 report estimated that preda-
tory lending cost consumers roughly $9.1 billion annually.16
II. CITIES AS LITIGANTS: STANDING AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES
Because the direct victims of predatory lending are dispropor-
tionately the elderly, minorities, and the less affluent, one might
expect that cities would seek to represent these victims by asserting
claims on their behalf against those engaging in these destructive
practices.  After all, the Supreme Court has long recognized the
legitimacy of parens patriae suits in which governments represent
the interests of their constituents.  The earliest decision to this ef-
fect came in the 1900 case of Louisiana v. Texas,17 which rejected
the claim on the merits but nevertheless observed that “the State is
entitled to seek relief in this way because the matters complained
of affect her citizens at large.”18  The Court’s most comprehensive
12. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (2000).
13. A metropolitan statistical area is defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census
based on economic and commuting flows between contiguous counties based on de-
cennial census data. See Population Div., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Lists of
Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas and Definitions (2006),
http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/metrodef.html.
14. Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA
Data, FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2006, at A123, A123.
15. Id. at A132.
16. ERIC STEIN, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE COST OF
PREDATORY LENDING 2 (2001), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf.
17. 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
18. Id. at 19.
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discussion of parens patriae standing appears in Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez.19  According to Snapp, a
parens patriae action seeks to vindicate “quasi-sovereign” inter-
ests.20  Those interests include a government’s concern for “the
health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its re-
sidents in general.”21  The action must promote “an interest apart
from the interests of particular private parties” and involve “a suf-
ficiently substantial segment of [the] population.”22
It is unclear whether cities could maintain parens patriae actions
over predatory lending.  All of the Supreme Court cases discussed
in the previous paragraph involved claims by states.23  The Court
has never specifically considered whether cities or other political
subdivisions may pursue such claims, but its treatment of these
subordinate units strongly implies that they may not do so.  For
example, the “state action” exemption from the antitrust laws24
does not apply to municipalities, counties, or similar subordinate
units.  Those units do not enjoy the attributes of sovereignty that
states possess.25  Specifically, our system “has no place for sover-
eign cities.”26  This position reflects a more general view that cities
and other political subdivisions do not enjoy the protection of the
Eleventh Amendment because they are not sovereign.  The Court
so held in the 1890 case of Lincoln County v. Luning.27  Although
19. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).  For a review of other parens patriae cases, see Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972).
20. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602.
21. Id. at 607.
22. Id.  The Court has also made clear that states may not pursue parens patriae
cases against the federal government.  Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86
(1923).
23. The statute under which Snapp arose treated Puerto Rico as a state. Snapp,
458 U.S. at 594 n.1, 608 n.15.
Nothing in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), affects the analysis here.
Whatever that case’s implications for the scope of parens patriae standing in general,
the dispute there had nothing to do with municipal standing.  The only issue dividing
the Court was whether a state had standing to challenge the federal government’s
refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Compare id. at 1454-55, 1455 n.17, with
id. at 1465-66, 1466 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
24. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
25. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53-54 (1982); City of
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411-12 (1978) (plurality opinion).
26. Cmty. Commc’ns, 455 U.S. at 53.
27. 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (observing that “while the county is territorially a part
of the state, yet politically it is also a corporation created by, and with such powers as
are given to it by, the state”). Lincoln County, which held that political subdivisions
did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment protection, was decided on the same day as Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), which significantly expanded the protection that states
enjoy under that provision.
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that decision has come under widespread criticism,28 it has been
consistently reaffirmed, most recently in the 2001 case of Board of
Trustees v. Garrett.29
Despite the Supreme Court’s silence, lower federal courts have
consistently held that municipalities and other political subdivi-
sions may not pursue parens patriae actions.30  Those rulings rely
on those units’ lack of sovereignty, precisely the grounds that the
Supreme Court has emphasized in the Eleventh Amendment and
antitrust contexts.31  Accordingly, cities concerned about predatory
lending almost certainly could not pursue parens patriae cases in
federal court.32
State courts might be more hospitable to such claims, but the
parens patriae jurisprudence involving municipalities is sparse.33
Most of the states that have considered the question agree with the
federal courts that municipalities and other political subdivisions
may not pursue parens patriae actions because those units lack sov-
ereignty.34  Several other states have focused more narrowly, con-
28. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 577, 580 (1994) (summarizing the nega-
tive scholarly reaction to the decision).
29. 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001); see also, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233
(1964).
30. Some lower courts have avoided the issue in situations where a ruling on the
point was not essential to the decision. See, e.g., City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292
F.3d 261, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that the city had standing to sue on the basis of
injury to itself); La Crosse County v. Gershman, Brickner & Bratton, Inc., 982 F.2d
1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the county had standing to sue as a direct
purchaser of services); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 733 n.3 (2d Cir.
1984) (observing that there was no dispute over the standing of other parties), aff’d
sub nom. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
31. City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004); Mount Evans
Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1453 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994); Colo. River Indian Tribes v.
Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. City of Pittsburg,
661 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1981); City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040,
1044-45 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Multidist. Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d
122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973).
32. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities
of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 365-66 (2006).
33. Several state courts, like their counterparts in the lower federal judiciary, have
avoided the issue of political-subdivision standing to pursue parens patriae claims.
See, e.g., Hayen v. County of Ogle, 463 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ill. 1984) (noting that the
issue had not been raised in the lower courts and that private parties clearly had
standing in their own right); Town of Holbrook v. Town of Randolph, 373 N.E.2d 941,
943 (Mass. 1978) (rejecting the claim on the merits without resolving parens patriae
standing).
34. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 718 P.2d
235, 241 (Colo. 1986); Bd. of Comm’rs v. Kokomo City Plan Comm’n, 330 N.E.2d 92,
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cluding that political subdivisions may not assert claims on behalf
of their residents against other government bodies while at least
implicitly leaving open the possibility of parens patriae actions in
other circumstances.35
We have found only one state where courts have clearly held
that municipalities may pursue parens patriae actions on behalf of
their residents.  That state is New York, where two cases have held
that local governments have authority to litigate parens patriae
claims on behalf of their residents.  In City of New York v. Wy-
man,36 the supreme court justice (the trial judge in that state) held
that the city had parens patriae standing to challenge a state policy
limiting public funding for abortions for indigent women.  The city
sought to vindicate “a two-fold public interest”: a financial interest
in avoiding unnecessary medical and social costs and a social inter-
est in the health, safety, and welfare of city residents.37  The New
York City charter explicitly authorized “actions in law or equity” in
“any court” on behalf of “the city or any part or portion thereof, or
of the people thereof,” so the municipal government had parens
patriae standing.38  Although this decision was ultimately reversed
on the merits, neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the dis-
senter in the appellate department (which affirmed the supreme
court’s judgment) questioned the city’s standing.39  More recently,
in Town of Riverhead v. Long Island Lighting Co.,40 a local govern-
101 (Ind. 1975); Clark County v. City of Las Vegas, 574 P.2d 1013, 1014 n.1 (Nev.
1978); County of Lexington v. City of Columbia, 400 S.E.2d 146, 147 (S.C. 1991).
35. See Douglas County Sch. Dist. 0001 v. Johanns, 694 N.W.2d 668, 673-74 (Neb.
2005) (holding that a school district had failed to rebut the presumption that the state
would adequately represent its interests in a challenge to the system of funding public
schools); State v. City of Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 530-32 (N.H. 2006) (concluding that
municipalities had not shown a compelling interest that would justify their indepen-
dent lawsuits against manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors of the gasoline addi-
tive MBTE when the state was already pursuing its own lawsuit); Twp. of Stafford v.
Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 711 A.2d 282, 289 (N.J. 1998) (finding that
“a municipal agency’s parens patriae interest in protecting the general public is insuffi-
cient to support standing to challenge an exercise of power by another municipal
agency”); County of Bergen v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 160 A.2d 811, 815 (N.J. 1960)
(finding that “each governmental entity is parens patriae within the orbit of its own
political responsibility” but that “the Port Authority rather than the county . . . repre-
sents the residents of the Port District with respect to the public function entrusted to
it”).
36. 321 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d per curiam on other grounds, 322 N.Y.S.2d
957 (App. Div. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 281 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1972).
37. Id. at 712-13.
38. Id. at 712.
39. See City of New York v. Wyman, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div. 1971)
(Steuer, J., dissenting), rev’d, 281 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1972).
40. 685 N.Y.S.2d 792 (App. Div. 1999) (mem.).
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ment was held to have parens patriae standing to abate a public
nuisance.41  It is possible that other local governments that enjoy
strong home-rule authority could assert parens patriae claims for
predatory lending.42  At this point, however, it seems unlikely that
very many cities could do so.43
Even though cities probably lack parens patriae standing to go
after predatory lenders, they might well be able to sue on their own
behalf to seek relief for harm to the community itself.  Several
courts that either did not reach the parens patriae issue or con-
cluded that political subdivisions had no such authority nonetheless
have held that those governmental units had standing in their own
right.  Most recently, the Ninth Circuit, in City of Sausalito v.
O’Neill,44 held that a municipality had standing to challenge the
adequacy of an environmental impact statement about plans to de-
velop a former military base.  Although the city lacked sovereignty
and thus could not sue as parens patriae,45 it did have standing to
assert various harms to its proprietary interests.  Among those pro-
prietary harms were increased traffic congestion that would raise
management and traffic safety concerns, disrupt the community’s
aesthetic appeal, reduce its tax revenues, impair air quality, in-
crease air pollution, and degrade local parks, trails, and shore ar-
eas.46  Similarly, the D.C. Circuit, in City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA,47
did not resolve the question of parens patriae standing in a suburb’s
challenge to the approval of a runway improvement project at
Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because the suburb had
41. The court cited only Snapp in support of its conclusion that the town could sue
on behalf of its residents. Id. at 793. But see Inc. Vill. of Northport v. Town of Hunt-
ington, 604 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 1993) (finding no parens patriae standing
where a local government simply aggregated “a collection of private suits” that did
not assert quasi-sovereign interests but allowing village trustees to sue as individual
residents of the community).
42. For further discussion of home rule, see infra Part III.
43. An Illinois court has characterized “home rule units” (such as the City of Chi-
cago) as “quasi-sovereign entities.” In re County Collector, 774 N.E.2d 832, 847 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2002).  One commentator has characterized this language as supporting the
notion that Illinois cities may bring parens patriae claims.  Engel, supra note 32, at
366.  Perhaps so, but that case did not address parens patriae.  Rather, the dispute
concerned the legality of property taxes levied by the City of Chicago.  The Illinois
Supreme Court chose not to decide whether “home rule units” or other political sub-
divisions may pursue parens patriae actions.  Hayen v. County of Ogle, 463 N.E.2d
124, 127 (Ill. 1984); see supra note 33.
44. 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004).
45. Id. at 1197.
46. Id. at 1198-1200.
47. 292 F.3d 261 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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asserted harm to its own economic interests, which was sufficient to
confer standing.48
State courts have reached similar conclusions.  Two Colorado
cases illustrate the point.  In Board of County Commissioners v.
Denver Board of Water Commissioners,49 the state supreme court
ruled that suburban counties lacked parens patriae standing but
could sue in their own right to force the Denver water agency to
continue supplying water on favorable terms.50  More recently, in
Board of County Commissioners v. City of Denver,51 a state appel-
late court held that suburban governments could sue as direct par-
ties to a contract limiting noise levels at the Denver International
Airport even though the suburbs could not pursue parens patriae
actions.52
In short, cities interested in litigating predatory-lending claims
will probably have to assert their own interests.  To do so in federal
court they will have to satisfy both constitutional and prudential
requirements.  The constitutional minima are that a plaintiff allege
a legally cognizable “injury in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the
defendant’s conduct and likely to be “redressed by a favorable de-
cision.”53  On the prudential side, a plaintiff must assert its own
interests rather than those of third parties, may not sue over gener-
alized grievances, and must be within the zone of interests pro-
tected by any statute on which it relies.54  Similar standing rules
apply in many state courts, although some states have less stringent
requirements in this regard.55
48. Id. at 268. See also Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1451-53 (10th
Cir. 1994) (holding that a county had standing, based on loss of revenue, to challenge
the U.S. Forest Service’s decision not to rebuild an income-generating structure that
had been destroyed by a fire); Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d
846, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the town had standing, based on dimin-
ished sales tax revenue, to challenge the tribe’s regulation of liquor sales on land
within the town); cf. City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (9th Cir.
1979) (finding that a city that wanted to develop its own regional shopping center
lacked antitrust standing to assert its own proprietary interests in an effort to prevent
a nearby community from developing a similar shopping center).
49. 718 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1986).
50. Id. at 241.
51. 40 P.3d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
52. Id. at 32.
53. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975).
55. States are free to apply more permissive rules for standing in cases involving
federal questions.  ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).  Some do so.
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One possible claim that a city might assert would be based on
the Fair Housing Act.56  As relevant to predatory lending, that stat-
ute prohibits racial discrimination in residential real estate transac-
tions, including the financing of such transactions.57  Because
predatory lending disproportionately affects persons of color,58 it is
possible that the practice might violate the Fair Housing Act.  This
suggestion raises two questions: (1) do cities have standing to sue
under the Fair Housing Act, and (2) may a Fair Housing Act plain-
tiff prevail on a disparate-impact theory?  The answer to both ques-
tions is a qualified yes.
As to standing, the Supreme Court held in Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood59 that a municipality can sue for its own inju-
ries that result from Fair Housing Act violations.  At issue in that
case were claims that real estate firms engaged in racial steering,
showing African American customers homes in a twelve-by-thir-
teen-block section of town while showing white customers homes
outside that area.60  The village argued that this practice unlawfully
manipulated its housing market, undermining the stability of an in-
tegrated neighborhood and encouraging white flight.61  This in turn
would reduce property values and the tax base needed to support
the provision of local services.62  Although the Fair Housing Act
does not refer to municipalities or other governmental institutions
as potential plaintiffs, the Court held that the village could be an
“aggrieved person” for purposes of the statute.  The Act defines an
“aggrieved person” as anyone “claim[ing] to have been injured by
See Engel, supra note 32, at 360-61; Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive
Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1835-37 (2001).
For a critique of permissive state standing requirements, see Michael E. Solimine,
Recalibrating Justiciability in Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 541-50 (2004).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
57. Section 805(a) of the Fair Housing Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate
against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or
conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handi-
cap, familial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).  Section 805(b)(1) defines covered transactions to include “the
making or purchasing of loans or providing other financial assistance” for the
purchase, construction, improvement, repair, or maintenance of a dwelling as well as
loans or other financial assistance that are “secured by residential real estate.”  Id.
§ 3605(b)(1).
58. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Engel, supra note 32, at 356 & n.6.
59. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
60. Id. at 95.
61. Id. at 109-10.
62. Id. at 110-11.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-2\FUJ206.txt unknown Seq: 13 17-MAY-07 13:36
2007] CITY GOV’TS AND PREDATORY LENDING 769
a discriminatory housing practice.”63  Congress may “expand
standing to the full extent permitted by” the Constitution64 and had
in fact done so in the Fair Housing Act.65  Because the legislative
branch had overridden prudential factors, standing under this stat-
ute was not limited to direct victims of discrimination.  All that
mattered was that the village had suffered “actual injury as a result
of the defendant’s conduct.”66  The key question was “not who pos-
sesses the legal rights protected by [the Fair Housing Act], but
whether [Bellwood was] genuinely injured by conduct that violates
someone’s [statutory] rights.”67  In other words, the village had to
satisfy only the constitutional test for standing: injury in fact, causa-
tion, and redressability.  The complaint alleged that the real estate
firms had engaged in racial discrimination that caused Bellwood to
suffer a legally cognizable harm that could be rectified by a
favorable judicial ruling.  That was sufficient for standing.68
As to disparate impact, the Supreme Court has never deter-
mined whether discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a Fair
Housing Act claim.69  The courts of appeals have generally held
that proof of discriminatory intent is not necessary, but they have
taken somewhat different approaches to disparate-impact claims.70
At the same time, there is general agreement that a showing of
disparate impact does not suffice to prove a statutory violation.71
This discussion suggests that a city might have standing to assert
a Fair Housing Act claim against predatory lenders.  The city
would have to allege that predatory lenders were engaging in racial
63. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1) (2000).
64. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100.
65. Id. at 109 (holding that standing under the Fair Housing Act is “as broa[d] as is
permitted by Article III of the Constitution”) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. Id. at 103 n.9.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 111, 115.  Elsewhere in the opinion the Court cautioned that there might
be limits to the geographical scope of a neighborhood that could be encompassed by a
Fair Housing Act complaint.  That point appears in the discussion of the standing of
individual plaintiffs. Id. at 114.  It is not clear whether this observation applies to
claims brought by cities or other political subdivisions.
69. Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction,
Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J.
409, 425 n.54 (1998).
70. See, e.g., Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000);
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-36 (2d Cir.),
aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th
Cir. 1986); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
71. See, e.g., Langlois, 207 F.3d at 49-50.
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discrimination in real estate financing and that this discrimination
harmed the city financially or socially.  These allegations would
presumably satisfy the constitutional test for standing.  The city
would not have to prove that the lenders intentionally discrimi-
nated against borrowers on the basis of race, but to prevail on the
merits it would have to establish a disproportionate impact on re-
sidents of color that was not sufficiently justified.  The likelihood of
success in such an endeavor is unclear.  Suffice it to say that we
have not found any reported case in which a city has advanced a
Fair Housing Act claim for predatory lending.
One leading commentator has suggested that, in light of the
complexity of standing doctrine, cities face potentially insurmount-
able obstacles to pursuing some alternative claims against preda-
tory lending.72  Other such claims could be difficult to prove on the
merits.73  For our purposes, what matters is that cities face numer-
ous uncertainties if they decide to litigate directly against predatory
lending.  For this reason, many communities have chosen instead to
try to regulate the practice.  As the next section makes clear, that
approach presents its own challenges.
III. CITIES AS REGULATORS: THE MEANING AND LIMITS OF
HOME RULE
Traditionally, cities had very limited authority.  Under the influ-
ential Dillon’s Rule, municipalities could exercise only those pow-
ers that the state explicitly granted or that flowed by clear and
necessary implication from explicit grants, with all doubts resolved
against the existence of local authority.74  The restrictive approach
72. Engel, supra note 32, at 378-82 (discussing fraud and unfair or deceptive prac-
tices claims).
73. Id. at 382-86 (discussing public nuisance and unjust enrichment).
74. See JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 55, at 101-02 (2d ed. 1872) (“It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied
in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable.”);
see also JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 237, at 448-49 (5th ed. 1911) (“It is a general and undisputed proposition of
law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and
no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but indis-
pensable.” ) (internal citations omitted).
The Supreme Court similarly held that cities, as creatures of the state, generally
enjoyed no federal constitutional protections against the states. See Hunter v. City of
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embodied in Dillon’s Rule proved to be quite controversial, be-
cause many people believe that local autonomy promotes impor-
tant social and political values.75  The great majority of states
eventually conferred some variant of home rule on municipali-
ties.76  Even when cities have home rule, however, state law might
preempt local initiatives.  This section focuses on state preemption
of local ordinances, with particular reference to cases that have re-
sulted in reported judicial decisions.77
Since North Carolina enacted its pioneering predatory lending
law in 1999,78 almost twenty cities and other local governments
have considered similar proposals.79  Almost all of the measures
that passed faced immediate legal challenges as well as efforts to
obtain preemptive state legislation.80  Courts in three large states—
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (“The state, . . . at its pleasure, may modify or
withdraw [any governmental] powers [it has entrusted to municipal corporations] . . .
with or without the consent of the [city’s] citizens, or even against their protest.”).
75. Supporters note that home rule promotes democratic participation, facilitates
the adoption of public policies that take account of local needs and local opinion,
promotes and enhances a sense of community, and affords opportunities for reform
and innovation. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-first Century, 36
URB. LAW. 253, 258-60 (2004).
76. Prominent scholars disagree over the extent to which home rule actually em-
powers cities and whether municipal autonomy necessarily promotes the public inter-
est. Compare Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057
(1980) (contending that the legal authority of cities remains unacceptably weak), with
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing that home rule prevents effective regional ap-
proaches to social problems and aggravates many of them), and Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990)
(criticizing unquestioning support for local autonomy); see also David J. Barron, Re-
claiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003) (suggesting that home rule em-
bodies a complex mixture of both grants and limitations on local authority).
77. More than two dozen states have enacted predatory lending laws.  Local gov-
ernments had not acted in most of those states, so preemption was not always at issue.
For a summary of the provisions of the state laws, see Baher Azmy, Squaring the
Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 361-78 (2005).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1.1E, 24-10.2 (West 2004); see supra note 5 (citing
evaluations of this measure).
79. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of Local Predatory
Lending Laws, app. B, at 44 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No.
2005-049B, 2005), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2005/2005-049.pdf.
80. In Philadelphia, for example, opponents filed suit in state court.  Even before
the court could rule on the ordinance’s validity, the state legislature enacted its own
bill that expressly preempted all municipal regulation of predatory lending. See
Kimm Tynan, Note, Pennsylvania Welcomes Predatory Lenders: Pennsylvania’s Act 55
Preempts Philadelphia’s Tough Ordinance But Provides Little Protection for Vulnera-
ble Borrowers, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 837, 872-84 (2003).  Meanwhile, in Atlanta, a trial
court enjoined the enforcement of a local ordinance; the state legislature subse-
quently passed its own bill that preempted municipal initiatives. See Azmy, supra
note 77, at 362 n.348; Anne-Marie Motto, Note, Skirting the Law: How Predatory
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New York, California, and Ohio—have issued published decisions
addressing the question of state preemption of local predatory
lending ordinances.  The New York and California courts ruled
against the cities, but the situation in Ohio is more complex: the
state’s appellate courts have taken divergent approaches to the is-
sue, but a recent supreme court ruling has found two municipal
ordinances to be preempted by state law.  These decisions suggest
that, at the very least, local laws and policies face a high likelihood
of frustration if opponents can influence state authorities to act.
The first of the state preemption cases, Mayor of New York v.
Council of New York,81 invalidated an ordinance that forbade the
city from doing business with predatory lenders.82  The court held
that the state’s banking law, which included specific provisions
dealing with “high-cost” loans, preempted the ordinance.83  The
opinion suggests two separate grounds for preemption: field and
conflict.  As to the former, the state statute was “a comprehensive
regulatory scheme” that occupied the entire field.84  Indeed, the
banking law specifically “provide[d] for ‘uniform regulation of the
residential mortgage lending process.’”85  Accordingly, the absence
of language expressly preempting local predatory lending measures
could not save the ordinance; the detailed state law suggested that
there was no room for local legislation relating to predatory lend-
ing.86  As to the latter, the city ordinance contained provisions that
Mortgage Lenders Are Destroying the American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859,
896 n.298 (2002) (citing Milo Ippolito, Finance Statutes Defeated in Courts, ATLANTA
J. CONST., Nov. 3, 2001, at 4H).
81. 780 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
82. The case arose in an odd posture: the city council passed the ordinance over
the mayor’s veto, after which the mayor sought a declaratory judgment that the ordi-
nance was invalid so that he would not have to enforce the measure. Id. at 269 & n.1.
This was not the only recent legal dispute between the mayor and the city council over
the validity and enforceability of a New York City ordinance.  Another dispute in-
volved the validity of a measure (also enacted over a mayoral veto) forbidding the
city from contracting with businesses that fail to provide benefits to registered domes-
tic partners of their employees equal to those afforded to the spouses of their married
workers. See Council of New York v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. 2006).
The complexity of those issues is reflected in the close division in the New York Court
of Appeals, which split 4-3 in that case. Id. at 447.
83. The state law was adopted shortly after the mayor vetoed the ordinance.
Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 273-74 (quoting N.Y. BANKING LAW § 589 (McKinney 2006)).
86. Id. at 274.
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were “in substantial conflict” with the state law and would there-
fore “disrupt the operation” of that statute.87
Just over a year later, a closely divided California Supreme
Court, in American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of Oakland,88
ruled that state law preempted another predatory lending ordi-
nance.  Both measures directly regulated home loans.89  Oakland’s
ordinance was stricter than the California statute.90  Notwithstand-
ing that difference, the majority relied on field preemption and
only indirectly addressed conflict preemption.  The state had im-
plicitly occupied the field.  Therefore, despite the absence of lan-
guage of express preemption, the state measure left no room for
local regulation.91  The state, rather than local governments, tradi-
tionally had regulated mortgage lending even before the adoption
of the predatory lending law.92  Moreover, statewide regulation
was essential.  The housing market was “critical” to the California
economy, and statewide regulation was “essential” because mort-
gage-backed securities were sold nationwide.93  Allowing munici-
palities to set their own standards would undermine the
“centralized and uniform” rules necessary for the economic wel-
fare of all California residents.94
Everyone involved in the Oakland case, including the city and
the dissenting justices in this 4-3 decision, agreed that the state had
a powerful interest in predatory lending.95  This consensus mat-
tered, because the California Constitution allows local govern-
ments to “make and enforce . . . all local, police, sanitary, and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws”96 and
also permits home rule communities to “make and enforce all ordi-
87. Id. at 275.  The court also held that the city ordinance was “substantially” pre-
empted by federal law. Id. at 276; see infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
88. 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005).
89. The state law was enacted eight days after the ordinance. Id. at 815.
90. For example, the Oakland ordinance applied to holders in due course, prohib-
ited most prepayment penalties, and required either that borrowers be provided with
loan counseling or that they explicitly waive such counseling.  The state law did not
apply to holders in due course, permitted prepayment penalties, and required only
that borrowers be encouraged to seek loan counseling. See id. at 819.
91. Id. at 820.
92. Id. at 822.
93. Id. at 823.
94. Id. at 825.
95. Id. at 820 (noting that the city “reasonably concedes regulation of predatory
practices in mortgage lending is one of statewide concern”); id. at 832 (George, C.J.,
dissenting) (observing that “regulation of predatory lending undoubtedly is an area of
statewide concern”).
96. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-2\FUJ206.txt unknown Seq: 18 17-MAY-07 13:36
774 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
nances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, . . . and in
respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws.”97  If
predatory lending was not a municipal affair but rather a question
of statewide concern, the case turned on whether the Oakland or-
dinance conflicted with the state law.
Disagreement centered on the strength of the evidence that the
legislature had implicitly preempted local initiatives and on
whether the state’s regulatory interest was sufficiently powerful to
trump the city’s interest in dealing with the adverse social and eco-
nomic consequences of the practice within its own borders.  The
dissenters emphasized undisputed evidence in the legislative his-
tory that mortgage lenders had strongly and unsuccessfully lobbied
for language expressly preempting measures such as the Oakland
ordinance.98  In fact, that measure was specifically discussed in a
state senate committee hearing.99  In the end, supporters of the bill
that the legislature ultimately enacted chose to say nothing at all
about preemption for fear that including such a provision would
doom the measure.100  This evidence strongly suggested that the
legislature had not implicitly preempted the Oakland ordinance.101
Moreover, the city had persuasive grounds for adopting its own
rules to supplement the state’s approach to predatory lending.  The
practice was unusually common in Oakland, disadvantaging both
the borrowers who were victimized by abusive practices and the
community as a whole.102  Under the circumstances, it was at least
as plausible to conclude that the legislature intended to establish
minimum statewide standards that local governments could supple-
ment as to find an unarticulated intention to preempt the entire
field of predatory lending regulation.103  The Oakland ordinance
did not “undermine” or “subvert” state regulations but simply af-
forded “additional protections” to city residents who were “espe-
cially vulnerable” to the shady practices of predatory lenders.104
The majority rejected both lines of this analysis.  First, this was a
case of implied preemption.105  Determining whether the legisla-
ture implicitly preempted local measures must be inferred not sim-
97. Id. § 5(a).
98. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d at 830-31 (George, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 830.
100. Id. at 831.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 832-33.
103. Id. at 834.
104. Id. at 835.
105. Id. at 820 (majority opinion).
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ply from the statutory text but also from the nature, purpose, and
scope of the state regulatory scheme.106  Any other approach
would effectively eliminate the entire doctrine of implied preemp-
tion.107  Second, the structure and purpose of the state law showed
that it left no room for local regulation.  Allowing more stringent
city ordinances would discourage legitimate subprime lenders from
making loans and either increase the cost or eliminate the availa-
bility of such loans to lower-income borrowers.108  The nature of
the problem suggested a need for “centralized and uniform” rules,
which in turn undercut the argument that the state statute set mini-
mum standards that cities could augment.109
We need not determine which side had the better of the argu-
ments.  For present purposes, it suffices that in California, as in
New York, courts have held that state laws preempt city ordinances
addressing predatory lending.  The situation in Ohio has been
somewhat settled until very recently.  The applicable home rule
guarantee in that state provides: “Municipalities shall have author-
ity to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other sim-
ilar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”110  Three
large cities in the Buckeye State have adopted predatory lending
ordinances; different districts of the Ohio Court of Appeals have
reached divergent conclusions about the validity of those ordi-
nances; the Ohio Supreme Court recently held that two of those
ordinances were unconstitutional.
The first Ohio decision came in City of Dayton v. State,111 in
which the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Second District found a
local ordinance to be preempted by state law.  As in Oakland and
New York City, Dayton adopted its predatory lending ordinance
before the state legislature enacted a statute dealing with the same
subject.112  Shortly after the state law became effective, the city
sought a declaratory judgment that the statute’s preemption provi-
106. Id. at 826-27.
107. Id. at 827.
108. Id. at 824.
109. Id. at 825.
110. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
111. 813 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
112. Id. at 710; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing New York R
City and New York State); supra text accompanying notes 98-99 (discussing Oakland
and California).  City ordinances in other states also seem to have stimulated state
action. See supra note 80 (discussing ordinances in Philadelphia and Atlanta that ap-
parently led to the passage of state laws in Pennsylvania and Georgia).
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sion violated the home rule provision of the Ohio Constitution.113
The appellate court first concluded that Dayton’s predatory lend-
ing ordinance did not deal with a matter of “local self-government”
within the meaning of the constitutional home rule guarantee, but
rather with “the use of police powers.”114  Applying a two-part test,
the court went on to hold that the preemption provision of the
state statute was a general law and that the Dayton ordinance con-
flicted with it, so the local measure had to give way.115
First, the state preemption provision satisfied the applicable
four-part test for general laws.116  That measure was part of a com-
prehensive bill that addressed many aspects of predatory lending.
Gaps and possible imperfections in that bill did not render it less
than comprehensive.117  Moreover, the statute applied throughout
the state, dealt with the police power, and established a general
rule of conduct.118
Second, although the home rule provision allows cities to adopt
stricter regulations than the state,119 Dayton’s ordinance conflicted
in several particulars with the state law.  The only example the
court cited was the annual percentage rate (“APR”) for loans de-
fined as predatory.  The state law defined as predatory those loans
with an APR that exceeds the yield on benchmark Treasury bills by
more than ten percentage points,120 while Dayton’s ordinance ap-
parently set a lower threshold.121  This disparity represented an im-
permissible implied conflict.122  Moreover, a provision in the
ordinance that forbade the city from contracting with predatory
lenders—a measure analogous to the New York City ordinance
that was struck down a few months earlier123—was an illegitimate
effort by the city to do indirectly what state law prohibited it from
doing directly, to regulate predatory lending.124
113. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 712.  For the language of the home rule provi-
sion, see supra text accompanying note 110.
114. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 714.
115. Id. at 722, 725.  Before getting to the two-part test, the court extensively re-
viewed and found it impossible to resolve the Ohio Supreme Court’s conflicting rul-
ings about the meaning of “statewide concern” and preemption. Id. at 714-21, 721-22.
116. See City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 964-65 (syl.), 968 (Ohio 2002).
117. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 723.
118. Id. at 724.
119. Id. at 725-26.
120. Id. at 711, 725.
121. Id. at 725.  Curiously, the opinion does not specify the threshold set by the
ordinance.
122. Id. at 726-27.
123. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
124. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 727.
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Six months later, in American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of
Cleveland,125 the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District
reached the opposite conclusion and upheld a different predatory
lending ordinance as a legitimate exercise of home rule.  At issue
here, as in City of Dayton, was the validity of the preemption provi-
sion in the state law.  Although the analytical framework was the
same in both cases, the Eighth District in City of Cleveland funda-
mentally disagreed with the Second District in City of Dayton.
Both courts did find that predatory lending ordinance was in every
important respect a police power regulation, not an exercise of lo-
cal self-government.126  In all other respects, however, the City of
Cleveland court came out the other way than did its City of Dayton
counterpart.
The Eighth District’s analysis in City of Cleveland began by ob-
serving that the Ohio Constitution’s home rule guarantee prevents
the legislature from completely preempting municipal authority.127
Focusing exclusively on the preemption provision instead of the en-
tire state statute, the court held that this measure could not be a
general law because it did not apply to “citizens generally” but cov-
ered only local legislative bodies.128  For this reason, the preemp-
tion provision was unconstitutional.129
Turning next to preemption, the City of Cleveland court found
no conflict between the city ordinance and the state law.  The state
law set minimum standards that the city was free to strengthen.
The city had not explicitly allowed anything specifically prohibited
by state law, nor did the state law expressly allow anything specifi-
cally prohibited by the city ordinance.130  Of course, there might be
an implicit conflict between the statute and the ordinance.131  That
possibility had no legal significance, however, because the Eighth
District saw no justification in Ohio law for recognizing the doc-
trine of implied preemption.132
About six months after this ruling (and just over a year after City
of Dayton was decided), the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Sixth
125. 824 N.E.2d 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006).
126. Id. at 558.
127. Id. at 559.
128. Id. at 560.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The Cleveland ordinance had lower thresholds for interest rates, points, and
fees as well as somewhat different disclosure requirements than did the state law.  The
ordinance also dealt with several issues that the state law did not address at all. See
id. at 557.
132. Id. at 560.
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District, in American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of Toledo,133
upheld the main provisions of yet another predatory lending ordi-
nance using an analysis similar to that in City of Cleveland.  The
opinion in City of Toledo, however, contained a more detailed
analysis of the issues.  The Sixth District, like the Second District in
City of Dayton,134 began by focusing on the entire state predatory
lending statute rather than on its preemption provision, and con-
cluded that the state measure was a general law.135  Nevertheless,
relying heavily on the Eighth District’s analysis in City of Cleve-
land, the City of Toledo court held that the statute’s preemption
provision violated the Ohio Constitution’s home rule guarantee.136
Although the preemption provision did not invalidate the entire
Toledo ordinance, two relatively minor provisions of the ordinance
did conflict with the state law.137  Both of those provisions were
severable,138 so the balance of the ordinance remained a valid exer-
cise of municipal authority.139
This brief summary makes clear that Ohio courts have disagreed
not only about whether cities have home rule authority to regulate
predatory lending but also about how to analyze that question.
The Second District in City of Dayton held that cities do not have
such authority, while the Eighth District in City of Cleveland and
the Sixth District in City of Toledo held that they do.  At the same
time, the Sixth and Eighth Districts disagreed about whether to fo-
cus exclusively on the state law’s preemption provision or on the
statute as a whole.  The Sixth District in City of Toledo agreed with
the Second District in City of Dayton that what mattered was the
entire statute, but they disagreed about whether that statute dis-
placed municipal regulation of predatory lending.
133. 830 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 859 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 2006).
134. See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text.
135. City of Toledo, 830 N.E.2d at 1243-44.
136. Id. at 1244.  In support of its conclusion on this issue, the City of Toledo court
quoted two pages of the City of Cleveland opinion. See id. at 1244-45 (quoting Am.
Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 824 N.E.2d 553, 560-61 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004),
rev’d, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006)).
137. One conflict concerned the penalties for payments under a home-improve-
ment contract, the other with the cancellation period for credit insurance. Id. at 1246-
47.
138. Id. at 1248.
139. The court also found that the private right of action created by the ordinance
violated the separation of powers doctrine by intruding on judicial authority and that
two other provisions were void for vagueness, but all of these relatively minor provi-
sions also were severable. Id. at 1249-51.  It bears emphasis that the problems with
these provisions had nothing to do with the city’s home rule powers.
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As this Article was going to press, the Ohio Supreme Court re-
versed the Eighth District and held that the Cleveland ordinance
was unconstitutional.  In American Financial Services Ass’n v. City
of Cleveland,140 the court concluded that the state’s legislation reg-
ulating predatory lending was a general law141 and that the more
stringent provisions of the Cleveland ordinance conflicted with the
state measure.142  A concurring justice reasoned that the state had
validly expressed its intention to occupy the field and that the ordi-
nance was therefore preempted regardless of any conflict with state
law.143  Two dissenting justices would have upheld the Cleveland
ordinance.  One found no conflict with state law;144 the other
thought that regulation of mortgage lending was not a matter of
statewide concern and hence that municipalities remained free to
adopt more stringent rules about predatory lending than the legis-
lature had enacted.145  A month later, relying on this ruling, the
court struck down the Toledo ordinance as well.146
The divergent approaches in the Ohio courts should not obscure
the lesson of this section: it is far from clear that cities have home
rule authority to regulate predatory lending at all, at least if the
state has enacted its own legislation in this field.  Even if the Ohio
Supreme Court upholds the power of Buckeye State cities, the
New York and California decisions involving the New York City
and Oakland ordinances stand as a warning that in two of our larg-
est and most influential states, municipalities have no power to reg-
ulate predatory lending no matter how much harm that practice
may do to local residents and the local social fabric.  This does not
necessarily mean that cities should sit idly by in the face of abuses.
After all, some states might permit cities to adopt their own ordi-
nances.  Even in states that do not allow local action, city initiatives
might well stimulate state legislation.  This was the pattern in all
three of these states and in others as well.147  Nevertheless, the sev-
140. 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006).
141. Id. at 784.
142. Id. at 785-86.
143. Id. at 790 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment only).
144. Id. at 791 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 795, 797-98 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  A thorough evaluation of these is-
sues is beyond the scope of this Article.  One of the authors is working on a separate
paper that seeks to analyze the proper scope of home rule authority to regulate pred-
atory lending in Ohio. See Shadya Y. Yazback, Home Lending and Home Rule in
Ohio: Municipal Regulation of Predatory Lending (unpublished manuscript on file
with the authors).
146. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Toledo, 859 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 2006) (mem.).
147. See supra notes 80, 83, 98-100; supra text accompanying note 112.
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eral decisions discussed in this section serve as a warning about the
limits of municipal action against predatory lending.
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Even if some cities have authority under state law to regulate
predatory lending, they might face yet another insurmountable ob-
stacle: federal preemption.  Many lending institutions that make
home loans are regulated by the federal government.  The National
Bank Act authorizes the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
to regulate nationally chartered banks,148 and the Home Owners
Loan Act authorizes the Office of Thrift Supervision to regulate
federal savings associations.149
In Mayor of New York v. Council of New York,150 a case dis-
cussed earlier in connection with home rule,151 the court held that
New York City’s ordinance prohibiting the city from doing busi-
ness with predatory lenders was preempted by federal law to the
extent that the ordinance applied to federally chartered banks and
federal savings associations.  With respect to nationally chartered
banks, regulations issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency preempted several provisions of the ordinance,152 and the
Exportation Doctrine of the National Bank Act preempted local
restrictions on interest rates.153  Even without a clear conflict be-
tween the ordinance and Comptroller of the Currency regulations,
allowing the city to apply its requirements to national banks would
create an obstacle to the fulfillment of federal policies.  That suf-
ficed to find these provisions of the ordinance preempted to the
extent that it applied to national banks.154  Moreover, to the extent
that enforcement of some parts of the ordinance entailed giving the
city access to the records of national banks and allowing it to regu-
late activities permitted by federal law, those parts purported to
confer on the city impermissible visitorial power over such banks
148. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 371 (2000).
149. Id. §§ 1462a-1464.
150. 780 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
151. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
152. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
153. Id.  The Exportation Doctrine is based on 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (allowing a
national bank to charge interest “at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Terri-
tory, or District where the bank is located”).  See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517
U.S. 735 (1996); Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299 (1978).  For a comprehensive discussion of the Exportation Doctrine, see
Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and
Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 539-600 (2004).
154. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
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without proper authorization.155  With respect to federal savings as-
sociations, Office of Thrift Supervision regulations expressly pre-
empted many provisions of the New York ordinance.156  In any
event, federal regulation was sufficiently pervasive as to occupy the
field, leaving no room for local initiatives applicable to such
institutions.157
The possibility of federal preemption goes well beyond local ini-
tiatives, however.  Both the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency and the Office of Thrift Supervision have taken the position
that federal law preempts state as well as municipal predatory
lending initiatives.158  No court has yet addressed that position with
regard to state predatory lending laws.  At the same time, a federal
district court in Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v.
Spitzer159 recently held that federal regulations prevent state au-
thorities from enforcing fair housing laws against national banks.160
Assuming that federal law and regulations do preempt state and
local predatory lending initiatives,161 cities that have home rule au-
thority to act might still have some reason to adopt predatory lend-
ing ordinances.  After all, federal preemption applies only to
federally regulated financial institutions.  Not all home loans are
155. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2000) (“No national bank shall be subject to any
visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or
such as shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either House
thereof or by any committee of Congress or of either House duly authorized.”).  The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated a regulation that defines
visitorial authority as “exclusive,” and to include “conducting examinations, inspect-
ing or requiring the production of books or records of national banks.”  12 C.F.R.
§§ 7.4000(a)(3),  7.4000(a)(1) (2007).
156. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 271 & n.7.
157. Id. at 272.  Finally, the court found that section 501 of the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (2000), expressly
preempted interest rates, points, and fees for first mortgages on one- to four-family
residences. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73.
158. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303,
1339-40 (2006).
159. 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
160. See also Clearing House Ass’n v. Spitzer, 394 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(reaching the same conclusion in a case brought by commercial banks).
161. Resolving whether federal law should preempt such initiatives is beyond the
scope of this Article.  Most commentators have criticized broad federal preemption as
either unauthorized by current law or unwise as a matter of policy.  See, e.g., Nicholas
Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274 (2004); Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A
Riposte to National Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 981 (2006); Forrester, supra note 158, at 1359-70; Diana
McMonagle, Note, In Pursuit of Safety and Soundness: An Analysis of the OCC’s
Anti-Predatory Lending Standard, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1533 (2004).
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made by such institutions or by entities that are related to them.
Although precise data are hard to come by, a noticeable fraction of
these loans is made by so-called nondepository institutions, i.e., en-
tities other than commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit
unions.162  Information compiled by the Federal Reserve System
shows that mortgage companies (which are nondepository institu-
tions) received more than sixty percent of all home loan applica-
tions in 2005 even though such companies made up only about one-
fifth of the total number of lenders.163  Some mortgage companies
are affiliated with federally regulated depository institutions, but
approximately fifteen percent were independent and therefore not
subject to federal regulation.164  We should treat these figures with
caution, however, because the Federal Reserve study covers only
about eighty percent of the country’s home lending.165  Although
we are dealing with an estimate, there is no reason to doubt that at
least some predatory loans are not subject to federal regulation.
That leaves room for state and local measures applicable to lenders
that are not encompassed by expansive federal preemption.
The justification for cities with home rule power to adopt preda-
tory lending ordinances might be stronger in some communities
than in others.  Subprime lending—which is not necessarily, but
often is, predatory166—has grown significantly in recent years, and
that growth has not been uniform.167  In some places, as many as
half of all home loans are made by entities that are not subject to
federal oversight.168  Cities facing that situation might find it im-
portant to fill this regulatory void, even if local ordinances might
be able to address only part of the predatory lending problem.
CONCLUSION
Communities that experience the abuses associated with preda-
tory lending have powerful reasons for seeking to combat the many
harms resulting from that phenomenon.  Unfortunately, they have
162. Avery et al., supra note 14, at A129.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at A123.
166. See supra text accompanying note 8.
167. See Susan M. Wachter et al., Subprime Lending: Neighborhood Patterns Over
Time in US Cities (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ. Research Paper No.
06-19, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=920847.
168. See, e.g., Becky Gaylord, City Let Banks Ignore Law, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Sept. 22, 2006, at A1 (citing a study finding that, in Cleveland, banks and
other regulated entities made about seventy percent of home loans in 2000 but only
around fifty percent of such loans in 2005).
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only limited legal tools available for this purpose.  Cities cannot
sue as parens patriae in federal court, and they might not be able to
do so in many state courts.  They might have standing to seek relief
for harm to the community, as opposed to individual residents, but
such lawsuits could founder on difficult problems of proof.  Di-
rectly regulating predatory lending poses additional challenges.  It
is far from clear that cities have authority under their home rule
powers.  Even if they do, state statutes might preempt important
aspects of municipal ordinances.  Perhaps more daunting, the pros-
pect of federal preemption of even state laws to the extent that
those laws apply to federally regulated lenders further limits the
possibilities for effective local measures.
Nevertheless, there might be good reasons for cities to consider
adopting their own regulations.  Most important, some cities might
have the authority to act.  Even if that authority is limited or non-
existent, municipal ordinances have stimulated state legislation.  To
be sure, state measures have not been as strong as the local initia-
tives that prompted them.  At the same time, getting even a weak
statute enacted provides an opportunity for strengthening amend-
ments in the future.  Perhaps state measures can help to persuade
federal authorities either to cut back on the scope of preemption or
to take more vigorous action against predatory lenders within the
sphere of their authority.  Additionally, federal preemption applies
only to national banks, federal savings associations, and their affili-
ates.  Although that covers a wide swath of residential lending, it
still allows for local action against other lenders that might have a
significant effect on a city’s social fabric.  In the end, cities working
alone cannot solve the predatory lending problem.  Some of them
might, however, help to serve as catalysts for whatever solutions
might be devised.
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